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tion of relevant empirical data which can be evaluated in light of policy
goals, so as to result in a practical, workable plan.9 5 The. court is usually
confined to a consideration of the case at hand, and can formulate rules to
control like situations, but any broader discussion will likely constitute dicta.
In contrast stands the legislature, of which Van Alstyne has said:
The potential scope of the legislative vision . . . is much broader.
In the process of legislative consideration the range of relevant
data is more expansive, transmutation of policy decisions into
statutory form is more flexible, and evaluation of practical con-
siderations may be better informed. 96
Therefore, the questions which must be asked in determining how to modi-
fy the doctrine of governmental immunity can be asked only by the legisla-
ture, since it alone has the machinery, time, and resources to provide the
most accurate and objective answers.
Daniel J. Graziano, Jr.
John B. Tehan
THE SOLICITATION RULE: ETHICAL
RESTRICTIONS AND LEGAL FICTIONS
A Preview
The present rules forbidding an attorney from soliciting professional employ-
ment are ill-advised, ineffective, and inherently arbitrary. These restrictions
favor wealthy and established lawyers to the detriment of poorer, younger,
and less established members of the bar. The sanctions, deeply rooted in the
common law, are stagnant remnants of a time when the legal profession was
a small, select, financially elite group, economically able to afford this laud-
able expression of altruism.' Financial and social disparities existing within
95. Id. at 164.
96. Id. at 163.
1. See H. DRINYER, LEGAL ETHics 210 (1953); 2 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
THE ENGLISH LAW 509-12 (3rd ed. 1927); R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY
TO MODERN TIMES 87-93 (1953). One commentator has observed that
The canons of ethics on business-getting are still built in terms of a town
of twenty-five thousand . . .- a town where reputation speaks itself from
mouth to mouth, even on the other side of the railroad track; and reputation
[Vol. 22:200
Solicitation Rule
the profession in modem times have undermined and antiquated the validity
and exigency of this concern.2  It is the purpose of this article to critically
examine the existing rules against solicitation and to illustrate their arbitrary
nature, while underscoring the thesis that the rules are an ineffective and in-
ept method of restraining the ethical violations at which they are purportedly
directed.
The constraints placed upon solicitation are patently arbitrary. While
Canons 27 and 28 of the American Bar Association Canons of Professional
Ethics 3 and Code 2 of the American Bar Association Code of Professional
Responsibility4 expressly forbid solicitation of any kind,5 there are three
notable exceptions to this general rule. First, bar associations exercise a
limited form of solicitation which includes general advertising by the bar
association concerning the desirability and necessity of competent legal coun-
sel in certain transactions, the establishment of lawyer referral systems, and
the publication of law lists presenting biographic materials concerning par-
ticipating attorneys. Second, labor unions and public interest groups have
been extended restricted solicitation privileges consistent with their constitu-
tionally-protected rights of free speech and association. 6 Finally, attorneys
not only of the oldster, but of the youngster. The youngster is watched when
he hangs out his shingle; watched if he be a hometown boy, watched doubly
if he be not.
K.N. Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices-and Cures? 5 LAW AND CON-
TEMPORARY PROBLEMS 115-16 (1938).
2. See J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN: A STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL PRACTI-
TIONERS IN CHICAGO (1962); A. BLAUSTEIN & C. PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER
(1954).
3. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics (1957) [hereinafter cited as ABA
CANONS].
4. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA
CODE].
5. ABA CANON 27 states, in pertinent part, that:
It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars, advertise-
ments, through touters or by personal communications or interviews not war-
ranted by personal relations.
ABA CANON 28 provides that:
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except
in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship, or trust make it his duty to
do so. . . . It is disreputable . . . to breed litigation by seeking out those
with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action
in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like
purposes .....
The restrictions of ABA CODE 2 are similar.
6. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (Va. statute regulating barratry,
champerty, and maintenance held unconstitutional as inhibiting the freedoms of
speech and association); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State
Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (first and fourteenth amendments held to prevent state
from interfering with activities of railroad workers' brotherhood in advising mem-
bers to obtain legal advice and in recommending specific lawyers). See also In re
Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 150 N.E.2d 163 (Ill. 1958).
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are permitted to solicit clientele, indirectly by political campaigning and di-
rectly by "country-club" activities. 7 There is no surer method for an attorney
to wave his academic and legal credentials before the public eye than to
campaign for public office. However, since the public is presumably bene-
fitted by the presence of competent attorneys in governmental positions of
trust, this publicity is unavoidable. On the other hand, the "country-club"
brand of solicitation, where lawyers engage, at the indirect subsidy of the na-
tional treasury," in extensive social activities to drum up business, is eth-
ically questionable. It is the established practitioner, and not the young,
solo, or unestablished one, who is able to "play nine" on Monday mornings
with a foursome of business prospects. It is the established practitioner who
is able to offer his cottage at the shore to potential clients. It is the estab-
lished practitioner who is able to "wine and dine" would-be "customers."
This final exception to the rules against solicitation is indicative of the
arbitrary nature of the current limitations.9 It is in this light, then, that the
arguments in favor of the restrictive rules must be analyzed.
The Traditional Rationale
The traditional arguments in favor of the rules against solicitation are four
in number:
1. Neglect of the Client's Interests. The most fundamental objection to
solicitation concerns the breach of the lawyer's duty to his client. A typical
judicial response to this violation of duty is found in In re Katzka, where
the court stated that the "business of ambulance chasing" made it "impos-
sible for an attorney to give honorable service to clients and courts."' 10
Since the solicitor's only concern, it is argued, is to make his "business"
as lucrative as possible, his livelihood depends upon a rapid turnover of
cases. To accomplish this, he must employ a team of runners who will make
a mad scramble to the bedside of the injured potential client to secure the
valuable retainer. To meet this added cost, group settlements and exorbitant
fees become the unavoidable standard operating procedure. The soliciting
lawyer, the argument continues, usually has a large number of claims against
7. See In re Cohn, 139 N.E.2d 301 (Il1. 1957) (Bristow, J., specially concurring).
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 162(a) provides for deductions from gross income
of all ordinary and necessary business expenses.
9. This article is concerned primarily with the inherently arbitrary nature of the
rules, rather than their arbitrary application. As to their application, compare In re
Cohn, 139 N.E.2d 301 and In re Donaghy, 83 N.E.2d 560 (Ill. 1948), with In re Katz,
241 N.Y.S. 317 (1st Dep't 1930) and In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D. Md. 1934). See
also 67 A.L.R.2d 859.
10. 232 N.Y.S. 573, 577 (1929). See generally 67 A.L.R.2d 859, 864 (cases cited
therein); J. COHEN, THE LAw-BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 174-75 (Rev. ed. 1924).
[Vol. 22:218
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the same insurer. Since his real skills lie in the apparently evasive art of
solicitation, negotiations between the solicitor and the insurance company
inevitably take the form of lump sum settlements with no concern for the
merits of each individual case. 1 Thus the solicitor is charged with inade-
quate settlements, exorbitant fees, overreaching, and under-representation.
Such practices are, of course, unethical.12  Case law, state and federal
statutes, and bar association codes provide sufficient redress for these
abuses.13  While the principal objections are, at best, logically tenuous and
factually questionable, two unwarranted suppositions underlie the entire ar-
gument. First, it is presumed that no competent attorney would solicit em-
ployment, or, conversely, that lawyers who do solicit are incompetent.' 4 This
presumption is grounded upon the notion that an attorney who breaches the
bar's ethical code cannot be an effective counsellor.15 Even granting that
solicitors as a class might be incompetent lawyers, it cannot be seriously
posited that, absent present restrictions, capable attorneys would not engage
in solicitation. Indeed, if the current ethical prohibitions were withdrawn,
there is no reason to believe that all attorneys would not solicit employment.
Second, the major argument assumes that solicitors will invariably subor-
dinate their client's interests to their own gain. This presumption, too, is
based on the theory that solicitors, being experts at solicitation and neo-
phytes at litigation, make poor lawyers. If this be so, an offending attorney
should be punished with more rapidity and severity than current procedures
provide." 6 If this is not so, this particular rationale for the rules against
solicitation fails to meet the test of relevancy.
11. See N.Y.U.L. REV. 182, 185-86 (1955); Philadelphia Bar Investigates Con-
tingent Fee Scandals, 12 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 144 (1929).
12. See State Bar v. Richards, 84 N.W.2d 136 (Neb. 1957); State ex rel. Lee v.
Buchanan, 191 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1966); ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, OPIN-
IONS; ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs; ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICs 269,
416, 463; Mo. BAR ADMINISTRATION, ADVISORY OPINIONS 17 (1958); Committee on
Professional Ethics, Opinions, 10 MIss. LAWYER 6 (1963).
13. There are four classes of remedies. First, once it is public knowledge that an
attorney engages in unethical practices, presumably his volume of business will decline.
Second, state and federal courts possess the power to reprimand, censure, suspend, or
disbar a violator. The ABA CANONS (29, 31, and 41 in general; 7, 10, 12, 15, 22, 28,
and 30 in specific) afford sufficient grounds for bar association control of these of-
fenses. Further, civil actions in tort and/or contract are available to an injured party
for any of these abuses. Finally, the presentation of fraud, whether it be related
to the claim, the testimony, or the evidence, is clear grounds for disbarment and
criminal sanctions. See generally 67 A.L.R.2d 859.
14. See Chreste v. Commonwealth, 186 S.W. 919 (Ky. Ct. App. 1916), af 'd, 198
S.W. 929 (Ky. 1917); In re Brooklyn Bar Ass'n, 227 N.Y.S. 666 (2d Dep't 1928);
J. COHEN, supra note 10, at 173-200.
15. Id. See also note 8 supra with text.
16. At present, bar association actions against ethical violators are slow, secretive,
and cumbersome. The procedure entails filing a complaint, an extensive investigation,
19721
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2. Impairment of the Administration of Justice. A standard criticism
levelled against solicitation is that it "stirs up litigation." The stirring up of
litigation was a common law felony, closely aligned to the crimes of barratry,17
champerty,' s and maintenance.' 0  The Minnesota Supreme Court has ex-
plained that
[tjhe general purpose of the law . . . was to prevent intermed-
dlers from stirring up strife and contention by vexatious or specula-
tive litigation, which could disturb the peace of society, lead to cor-
rupt practices, and prevent the remedial process of the law.20
The fear of the common law was that, if a claim was stirred up, the insti-
gating party would control the result.21  While public policy demands that
parties before a court have a real interest in the outcome of the litigation, it
must be noted that the rules against solicitation only peripherally address
themselves to this issue. Its solution lies not in the current prohibitions, but
in the enforcement and improvement of measures against corruption in the
legal system.
2 2
It is, moreover, an objective obligation of the court system to enforce all
valid, substantial claims. Members of the bar, as officers of the court and
fiduciaries of the litigants, have a dual obligation to foster the resolution of
societal conflicts and to protect and enforce their client's rights. 23  If this
be the primary purpose of the court system, stirring up justifiable litigation
is not only an acceptable activity, but, indeed, an essential one. Since most
clients are unfamiliar with the methods of securing legal counsel and are
faced with the practical pressure for immediate settlement, it is the enforce-
ment of the rules rather than their violation that vitiates the important public
policy of resolving conflicts. Apparently, however, the law is more con-
committee hearings, judicial approval, and appellate confirmation. Punishment is
meted out only where there is a "clear case of misconduct affecting the character and
standing of the lawyer as an attorney." 67 A.L.R.2d 859, 863. See also note 7 supra.
17. Barratry: "The offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and
suits, either at law or otherwise." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 190 (4th ed. 1968).
18. Champerty: "A bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit, by which such
third person undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own cost and risk, in considera-
tion of receiving, if successful, a part of the proceeds or subjects sought to be recov-
ered." Id. at 292.
19. Maintenance: "An unauthorized and officious interference in a suit in which
the offender has an interest, to assist one of the parties to it, against the other, with
money or advice to prosecute or defend the action." Id. at 1106.
20. Gammons v. Johnson, 78 N.W. 1035, 1037 (Minn. 1899).
21. WINFIELD, HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 142
(1921); Holloway v. Lowe, 7 Porter 488 (Ala. 1838).
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 65, 66 (1957) is a typical state response to corrup-
tion in the courts.




cerned with a shotgun-blast regulation of the profession than with the rectifi-
cation of the individual's substantive rights.24
The anti-solicitor's argument does not, however, stop here. A natural con-
sequence, it is asserted, of stirring up litigation is the congestion of court
calendars. 25 This theory stands upon weak grounds. First, it directly con-
tradicts the argument that solicitors invariably settle their cases at the bar-
gaining table. Second, it reflects a paranoic tendency by the bar in ascribing
its own failure to remedy the court-congestion problem upon other, more sus-
ceptible individuals.
Finally, the solicitor is charged with fostering fraudulent claims, perjurious
testimony, and manufactured evidence. 26  Presuming that the solicitor's
practice depends on a rapid flow of cases, this argument insists that, where
a tort occurs and the litigant's resulting physical or mental condition is bor-
derline, the soliciting attorney will encourage fraud. From this, "it is but a
short step from exaggeration of an injury to the manufacture of a claim."'27
Investigations have generally supported this notion by revealing instances of
fictitious claims and perjurious testimony.2 s
There is, of course, a vital public policy against fraud in the court sys-
tem.29  It is not clear, however, that the solicitation of professional employ-
ment increases the occurrence of fraud. Even accepting that solicited claims
are less substantial and less valid than non-solicited ones, it does not neces-
sarily follow that soliciting attorneys will attempt to perpetrate fraud upon
a court since
[a]ny temptation . . . to exaggerate the validity of a claim to
secure employment is reduced by the fact that there will be no
compensation if the claim is invalid.
3 0
Further, in the federal court system, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (b) denies costs, and
even grants the courts the discretion to impose them, to the plaintiff who ad-
vances unmeritorious claims. An attorney is also subject to severe repri-
mand for this conduct.
31
3. Tendency of Solicitation to Expand. A major rationale for disciplinary
actions in solicitation cases is its deterrent effect. The Wisconsin Supreme
24. See F. C. HicKs, ORGANIZATION AND ETHics OF THE BENCH AND BAR 261-69
(1932).
25. See In re Rothbard, 232 N.Y.S. 582 (2d Dep't 1929) (cases cited therein).
26. See, e.g., In re Kopleton, 241 N.Y.S. 171 (1st Dep't 1930); 67 A.L.R.2d
859, 921-24.
27. 20 THE GREEN BAG 145 (1908), cited in 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 182, 187 (1955).
28. See, e.g., 14 MAss. L.Q. 1 (1928).
29. See note 20 supra, with text.
30. 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 674, 679 (1958). See 2 BoSwELL, THE LIFE OF JOHNsON
47-48 (Hill ed. 1887).
31. See note 11 supra.
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Court has noted that "the punishment . . . for unprofessional conduct should
be influenced by . . . the effect that it may have upon others with a view of
stamping out the evil." -32  The practice tends, if left unguarded, to increase
and perpetuate itself. If it is impossible to obtain clients because of the over-
aggressive competition of others, the temptation is, indeed, great to employ the
same practices that are channeling clients into other law offices. While this
criticism is telling, it is open to attack on two grounds. First, the theory that
discipline leads to obedience has been impaired, in recent years, by leading
criminologists here and in England.33 Rather than discouraging the unethical
practice, an overzealous enforcement of the solicitation rules could result in a
more sophisticated and less perceivable violation of them. The principal
criticism misses the mark, secondly, in its continued presumption that the
profession, if not strictly regulated, would discard ethical priorities. In
those areas where solicitors have gained control of a field of litigation, there
is an understandable tendency for those abstaining members of the bar to
also engage in the practice.3 4 The argument, however, cuts both ways. If ex-
panded solicitation were allowed, with rigorous enforcement of the undesirable
side effects, attorneys would not be forced into this ethical dilemma.
4. Detriment to the Profession. The final objection to solicitation is the
social ill-repute it brings upon the profession by its unfair competition and its
commercializing effects.
Rather than aiding the young attorney in establishing his practice, the
rules against solicitation inhibit him.35 It is the established lawyer who can
afford the luxuries of the country-club and the campaign trail. The young
attorney is at a distinct disadvantage to his established counterpart who has
clients, connections, and capital. In short, rather than improving the bar's
public image, this discrimination serves only to underscore the disparities and
inequities existing within the profession.
Further, the bar fears that the public would lose respect for the profession
if its goals were commercially rather than service oriented. Witness Julius
Cohen's remark that:
32. State v. Kiefer, 222 N.W. 795, 796-97 (Wisc. 1929). See also State v. Rubin,
142 So. 2d 65, 67 (Fla. 1962) ("disciplinary . . .proceedings .. . are solely for the
purpose of purging the roll of legal practitioners of an unworthy or disreputable
member.").
33. See A. GOLDSTEIN, CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIETY (1971); I INBAU et al., CRIIMINAL
JUSTICE 443-51 (1968); REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
(1953).
34. See, e.g., the virtual domination by solicitors of personal injury suits in Chicago.
Settlement of Personal Injury Cases in the Chicago Area, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 895 (1953).
35. See Price Discrimination in Medicine, I J.L. AND ECON. 20 (1958). But see
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 27 (1908):
The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
[Vol. 22:218
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The basis of the relationship between lawyer and client is one of
unselfish devotion, of disinterested loyalty to the client's interest,
above and beyond his own. Let the lawyer seek you for his own
profit and you despise him.36
Further note Canon 12's dictate that:
It must never be forgotten that the profession is a branch of
justice and not a mere money-getting trade.
3 7
And heed Henry Drinker's observation that lawyers differ from other indi-
viduals merely
in being members of a profession. This is not a fancied conceit,
but a cherished tradition, the preservation of which is essential to
the lawyer's reverence to his calling. 3s
The answer to these contentions lies in the public's conceptualization of
the attorney. The vaunted public opinion of the profession, so cherished
and nurtured by the bar, is not wholeheartedly shared by the public itself.39
The very idea of the lawyer as a "disinterested champion of justice" is in
conflict with the popular notions of an effective attorney in the adversary
system. It is the rare layman who is able to grasp the legal sophism that an
attorney, owing his "entire devotion," "warm zeal," and "utmost learning
and ability" to his client's interests, has similar obligations to the court and
to his colleagues. Finally, the idea that "disrespect for the lawyer leads to dis-
respect for law" is unfounded in light of the common law experience. 40 The
reader need look no farther than Lawyer Tulkinghorn in Dickens' Bleak
House to find a popular depiction of the legal profession. And yet, the com-
mon law tradition is squarely grounded upon the social principle of law. 41
Here again the prohibitions against solicitation bring disrepute, rather than
distinction, upon the profession.
Countervailing Considerations
Aside from the considerations discussed above, there are other factors which
militate in favor of an expansion of the current solicitation rules.
36. J. COHEN, supra note 10, at 197.
37. ABA CANON 12 (1957).
38. H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 211.
39. See D. Riesman, Some Observations on Law and Psychology, 19 U. Cm. L. R'v.
30 (1951). It is the present author's opinion that a great deal of the public
"esteem" placed in the profession is attributable to the public relations work done by
the bar to prevent the publication or production of materials "reflecting upon or
derogatory to lawyers." 77 A.B.A. REP. 261 (1952). See COUNTRYMAN & FINMAN,
THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY 378-92 (1966). The ABA has gone so far as
to establish a standing committee on public relations for just this purpose.
40. 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 674, 681 (1958). See also R. POUND, supra note 1; T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (4th ed. 1948).
41. Id.
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Since the solicitation of professional employment is not malum in se, the
present sanctions form a bar-imposed code of profession etiquette. 42  The
frequence and notoriety with which the rules are violated attest to the propo-
sition that these prohibitions have lost support among members of the bar.43
And, as Henry Drinker has maintained in his defense of the traditional
rules, the only significant reduction of the problem has come from the aboli-
tion of the actions most frequently solicited. 44
All the ethical violations cited by the proponents of the rules have corre-
sponding actions for their remedy. 45  Placing the feared detriment to the
profession to one side, clients, courts, and counsellors are sufficiently pro-
tected by existing legal vehicles. As to the supposed ill-repute solicitation
brings upon the bar, it is time that the profession and its members come to
grips with the separate problem of making their rhetoric consistent with their
actions. Every member of the bar takes an oath of office, similar to that
set forth in the margin, 40 pledging himself to the highest duties of honor.
There is nothing inconsistent with that oath, or the principles it encom-
passes, and a more expansive solicitation rule. In short, if the profession
is so concerned with its public image, then let it give the public no grounds
on which it can be disparaged.
Finally, the right to practice law should include the right to employ all
lawful means of achieving success at it. There are, it is true, distinct differ-
ences between the attorney and other members of the community. The most
42. H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 64.
43. In one area, it is estimated that 95% of all serious personal injury claims were
solicited. See note 32 supra.
44. H. DRINKER, supra.
45. See note 11 supra.
46. ABA Recommended Oath of Admission:
I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR:
I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of
the State of _;
I will maintain the respect due to Courts of Justice and judicial officers;
I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall appear to
me to be unjust, nor any defense except such as I believe to be honestly de-
batable under the law of the land;
I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me
such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and will never seek
to mislead the Judge or jury by any artifice or false statement of fact or law;
I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my
client, and will accept no compensation in connection with his business except
from him or with his knowledge and approval;
I will abstain from all offensive personality, and advance no fact prejudi-
cial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which I am charged;
I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause
of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any man's cause for lucre or malice.
SO HELP ME GOD.
226 [Vol. 22:218
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notable and the most important ones are, of course, the special relationships
existing between the lawyer and his client and between the lawyer and the
court. However, with the enforcement of all pertinent restrictions and with
a positive effort by the individual attorney to maintain and upgrade the pro-
fession, these relationships can be left intact, while liberalizing the present
rules.
Conclusion
Current sanctions prohibit solicitation of any action except in rare situations.
The continued validity and vitality of these restrictions are necessarily predi-
cated upon an acceptance of their underlying presumptions: (1) that the
rules are the most effective means of controlling certain diverse ethical vio-
lations; and (2) that, absent these prohibitions, attorneys would, success-
fully and with impunity, engage in these breaches of conduct and duty.
It has been a purpose of this article to illustrate the invalidity of these as-
sumptions. Legal devices to curb ethical violations are in existence and
readily available. In light of the many considerations advanced here, the
rules must be reformulated on some basis other than unqualified prohibition.
Where to draw the line, however, is quite a different story.
Gregory A. Adamski
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